I. INTRODUCTION
This study is motivated by two related empirical puzzles. The first is that student-level and school-level data often show little evidence of a relationship between student performance and school inputs, after controlling for the student's background [Hanushek 1986 ; Betts 1995; Grogger 1995] .1 The second is that metropolitan areas with few opportunities for competition among public schools tend to have more generous school inputs-including higher per-pupil spending, higher teacher salaries, and lower student-teacher ratios-but also tend to have worse student performance [Hoxby 1995a ]. These empirical results suggest the existence of some school characteristic that tends to increase inputs while tending, at the same time, to lower the effectiveness of each input. Teachers' unions, while not the only candidate for this role, are worth examining since they try to obtain more generous inputs and have the potential to change the efficacy of inputs. Since teachers' collective bargaining is a phenomenon of the past 35 years, the evidence presented not only helps to explain the empiri-law changes is used to identify the effects of unionization. This identification strategy is discussed in detail in Section V.
This study continues a large literature on teachers' unions. Eberts and Stone [1986, 1987] use the Sustaining Effects Survey and the High School and Beyond survey, which ask whether teachers are unionized. In the 1987 study they examine changes in students' test scores over time and find that teachers' unions improve productivity. In the 1986 study they infer that schools with teachers' unions have worse productivity. In both studies, however, Eberts and Stone use unionization status at a point in time. They do not observe individual schools before and after unionization. Kleiner and Petree [1988] , using state aggregate data from 1972 to 1982, relate teachers' unionization to school resources, SAT scores, and graduation rates. Using both crosssectional and first-differenced regressions, they find more generous resources and higher student performance in states where a greater share of teachers are unionized. However, Peltzman [1995] uses first-differences on state aggregate data from 1970 to 1991 and finds a negative relationship between a state's unionization and its students' AFQT scores.2 Since the Peltzman and Kleiner and Petree studies use similar methods on aggregate data, the conflict in their results appears to be due to differences in their unionization measures or the difference in the demographic variables for which they control. In any case, there is clearly little consensus on teachers' unions. This study attempts to build consensus by extending the best features of previous studies-for instance, greatly expanding coverage of individual school districts and using richer longitudinal methods. This study also introduces refined measures of unionization and new strategies to deal with potential endogeneity in unionization. One goal is to clarify the contentious question about whether and why school inputs do or do not matter. Another is to illuminate the mechanism that links competition among schools to better student achievement and school productivity.
II. TEACHERS' UNIONS AND THE EDUCATION PRODUCTION FUNCTION
I denote as "rent-seeking" the model in which teachers' unions prefer different inputs than parents do because the 2. The pre-1984 literature largely examined teacher salaries and class size rather than student achievement or productivity. For examples, see Kasper [1970] , Hall and Carroll [1973] , and Baugh and Stone [1982] .
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union's objective is not purely maximization of student achievement. I denote as "efficiency-enhancing" the model in which unions prefer different inputs because they have the same fundamental objective as parents but (1) have superior information about students and input efficacy or (2) internalize externalities in education production that parents neglect. The rent-seeking and efficiency-enhancing models have different implications for education production functions, which may operate through three routes. Consider Figure I , which shows iso-achievement curves for student achievement (denoted "iso-A"). The examples of inputs used are teacher salaries and books. Given a school budget and input prices, the tangency between the budget constraint and the iso-achievement map determines maximum student achievement and the optimal allocation of the budget among inputs. For the remainder of this section, I simply assume that unions are able to raise budgets by exercising market power over teacher inputs. In the final section of this paper, I relate unions' ability to exercise market power to the structure of the local schooling market. Figure I shows the case of a rent-seeking union. A teachers' union, by monopolizing the services of incumbent teachers and creating a political coalition in local elections, may be able to increase the budget and move to previously inaccessible points. Thus, the first possible effect of teachers' unions is through the budget (point A to point B). Even if the union is rent seeking, such an increase in the budget may be social welfare enhancing. This would occur if budgets are otherwise too low owing to uninternalized positive externalities associated with schools or imperfect capital markets for human capital investments (liquidityconstrained parents). The second possible effect of teachers' unions is through allocation of the budget among inputs. If teachers have an objective function that maximizes their utility rather than student achievement, then there is a set of teacher indifference curves (denoted "ID-tchr") whose curvature reflects the direct utility to teachers of certain inputs, such as higher salaries. For any given budget, teachers' indifference curves determine a level of student achievement that is lower than the maximum feasible student achievement (point B to point C). The third possible effect of unions is through the productivity of measured school inputs. Actual school inputs always include a degree of teacher effort or teacher quality, though measured school inputs do not. For instance, the actual school input should be "intensity Input Choices under a Rent-Seeking Union of student-teacher interactions," which includes teacher effort, but the measured school input is class size or student-teacher ratio, which does not. If unions reduce teacher effort for any given mix of measured school inputs, then the budget effectively shrinks since the price of an actual unit of school input rises with unionization (point C to point D). Now consider an efficiency-enhancing teachers' union that maximizes student achievement and uses its "voice" [Freeman and Medoff 1984 ] to announce teachers' superior knowledge (Figure II) . Such a union might use its monopoly or political power or both in local elections to increase the school budget to the point that is optimal when positive externalities of education are accounted (point E to point F). Teachers may have more accurate knowledge about the productivity of school inputs or the interactions of school inputs, so that teachers see a different isoachievement map than parents see (denoted "iso-A (tchr)"). The union chooses a different mix of inputs accordingly (point F to point G). Finally, if a union empowers teachers or makes them behave more professionally (as suggested by union leaders), it 
Because we (1) expect increased budgets under either type of union and (2) cannot distinguish easily between inputs that simply benefit teachers and inputs that parents undervalue, the productivity of school inputs is the distinguishing feature that separates voice and rent-seeking behavior. This is why estimating productivity, by relating unionization to student achievement as well as to inputs, is crucial.
III. TEACHERS' UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Teachers' unions, like other public sector unions, are largely a post-1960 phenomenon in the United States. (See Murphy [1990] for a good history of teachers' unionism.) Yet, teachers' unionism has a somewhat unique and confusing history because teachers' unions were formed by converting existing teachers' professional associations. The teachers' unionization movement began when the teachers' professional associations of a few large, central city districts began to use union tactics, such as strikes, though they were not recognized as unions per se. One of these was the progenitor of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) which signaled its status as a union by AFL-CIO affiliation and which grew by converting professional associations and absorbing independent unions. The activities of the AFT induced the National Education Association (NEA), which had long served as the major professional organization for teachers, to begin performing collective bargaining and otherwise functioning as a union in some schools. Currently, schools are unionized on a district-by-district basis and most teachers' unions are affiliated with the AFT or NEA. Nearly all public school districts have a teachers' organization, but many schools with organizations still effectively remain nonunion.
A. Measuring Unionization
In 1963, 93 percent of school districts reported a teachers' organization. However, most of these organizations acted in a purely advisory capacity, and about one-half had no formal relationship with the school board. Just 10 percent had explicitly agreed to "meet and confer," and only 1 percent had a collective bargaining agreement. Even by 1966 only 8 percent of school dis-3. Computed by the author using statistics from Perry and Wildman [1966] . tricts were bound by collective bargaining agreements, and these were mainly central city districts in Michigan, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Table I shows school district reports of teacher organization and unionization from 1963 to 1992. The table demonstrates that, if unrefined definitions of unionization are used, measurement error produces wide variation in estimates of union activity. For instance, in 1992 all districts (100 percent) reported that some teachers belonged to a teachers' organization, yet only 59 percent of districts reported at least a memorandum of understanding. A memorandum of understanding is the outcome of "meeting and conferring," which is the least binding type of formal negotiation between administration and union. So, many schools with teachers' organizations had little or no formal negotiation. Similarly, 54 percent of districts reported that collective bargaining occurred, yet only 36 percent reported that a contractual agreement between the teachers' union and administration existed (or had existed previously, for schools in the midst of negotiations) and that at least 50 percent of the teachers were members of the teachers' organization.4 Since contractual agreements are the outcome of successful collective bargaining and collective bargaining generally will not occur unless at least 50 percent of the teachers are union members, the natural inference is that some respondents do not differentiate (1) between unionization and the possibility of collective bargaining or (2) between collective bargaining and less binding forms of negotiation.
In this study I will consistently use the strict definition of unionization (collective bargaining, contractual agreement, and 50 percent union membership), represented by the right-hand column of Table I . When I use a more permissive measure of unionization, such as just "collective bargaining is the form of labor relations" (represented by the middle column of Table I ), results are similar though attenuated, as expected.5
The AFT is generally attributed to behave more aggressively than the NEA. I show elsewhere [Hoxby 1995b ] that many of the apparent differences between the behavior of AFT and NEA affiliates disappear when the definition of unionization is refined.
4. Since schools that unionize tend to have larger student populations than schools that do not unionize, these numbers understate the number of students affected by unionization (see the numbers in square brackets in Table I ). For instance, only 54 percent of schools reported collective bargaining as the form of negotiations in 1992, but 63 percent of students attended such schools.
5. These results are available from the author upon request. I use as instruments only the passage of laws that allow union activities, rather than the passage of laws that explicitly forbid union activities, such as a ban on strikes, because "forbidding" sometimes laws appear to have been a response to the onset of the forbidden activity. In contrast, "permitting" laws appear to lead, rather than lag, bursts of union activity. [1988] . For laws passed from 1986 to 1992, the source is the author's searches on LEXIS, a legal information retrieval system. The combined differences-in-differences/instrumental variables strategy does not require that the timing of laws be generally arbitrary. It requires only that the timing be determined by (1) factors that trend steadily over time within a state and (2) state-level factors that do not directly affect student achievement or school input choices. The essential restriction is that timing of passage of a relevant law is uncorrelated with the timing of an acceleration in other statewide variables that directly affect students or schools. No school district coding scheme completely unifies the three tabulations, so that matching required careful examination of changes in school district coding and school district boundaries. If two or more districts consolidated into one district over the period, the constituent districts were "preconsolidated" in earlier Censuses and indicator variables were created to record the consolidation. Five hundred and eighty-five districts could not be successfully matched and were dropped from the analysis, leaving 10,509 schools districts (about 95 percent of the total in the United States in 1990).
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The demographic variables drawn from the Censuses of Popu-8. Under this definition, few schools shift both in and out of unionization between years of the Census of Governments (1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992) . The most stringent part of the definition is the requirement of a contractual agreement. A definition that uses only this requirement does not discernibly affect the results. lation include population, black population, Hispanic population, urban population, population in poverty, adult population with at least twelve years of schooling, adult population with at least sixteen years of schooling, total K-12 enrollment, private K-12 enrollment, black K-12 enrollment, median household income, median gross monthly rent, the unemployment rate, and the percentages of the population aged 16 to 19 and aged 18 to 19. Only one measure of student achievement can be derived from the Census for each school district: the high school dropout rate, defined as the percentage of 16 to 19 year-olds who are not enrolled and do not have high school degrees. This measure has the advantage of reflecting local K-12 education rather than higher education and of being particularly sensitive to the lower portion of the student achievement distribution, which teachers' unions often claim to most affect. Because the measure is potentially sensitive to migration of 18 to 19 year-olds (owing to college, job opportunities, or social opportunities), I control for the percentage of the 16 to 19 year-old population who are aged 18 to 19. It would be good to have additional measures such as test scores, but consistent test scores that span the 1970-1990 period do not exist at the school district level for a universal (or even large) sample of individual school districts. Other measures such as wages and ultimate educational attainment cannot be linked to school districts since mobility among districts is high and nonrandom.
The final major source of data is the NBER Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set (see Valletta and Freeman [1988] ), which summarizes state laws governing teachers' unionization for every year after 1954. From this source (which I updated from 1986 to 1992 using LEXIS searches) I derive indicator variables for the laws assigning schools a duty to meet with teachers' organizations, laws specifically allowing agency shops in schools, and laws specifically allowing union shops in schools.
V. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In this section I discuss econometric issues common to the four basic equations I estimate. The per-pupil budget, "Log(PerPupilExp)," equation derives from equation (4). Two school input equations derive from equation (3). One is for the log average teacher salary, "Log(TchSal)," and the other is for the studentteacher ratio, "STRatio." The education production function de-rives from substituting equations (2), (5), and (6) into equation (1). It uses the high school dropout rate, "Dropout," as the measure of student achievement. The equations are Since many district characteristics, such as the distance from the central city and housing stock are relatively fixed over time, these estimates should be an improvement on the cross-section estimates. However, I expect these estimates to suffer from measurement error bias exacerbated by firstdifferencing.
Next, I estimate the equation with time differences-indifferences between the 1970-1980 differences and the 1980-1990 differences. Since there are only three years in the panel, this is equivalent to estimating the equations with district fixed effects, time fixed effects, and district-specific time trends. The district-specific time trends eliminate unobserved district characteristics that have constant time trends ((tslits2itgit). Many district characteristics that affect both unionization and schools trend rather steadily. For example, housing stock in a district may gradually decay, or job opportunities nearby may gradually become more oriented toward professionals and managers. What drives the differences-in-differences results is acceleration or deceleration in the time trends of school inputs or student achievement that is associated with the discrete event of unionization. The reason that differences-in-differences is appropriate to the analysis of unionization is that, because unionization occurs through a teacher vote, the event of unionization is discrete even if its determinants trend constantly.
The identification problem that possibly remains results from potential correlation between shocks to unobserved districttime-specific characteristics (( tlits2itid and the discrete change in unionization. A solution is the use of instrumental variables that (1) are uncorrelated with shocks ((,slititit) occurring in school districts but (2) cause unionization to change discretely when they change discretely. State laws that facilitate teachers' unionization are good candidates. The fact that a state law changed discretely does not necessarily indicate that the state, as a whole, experienced any statewide, time-specific shock that might also affect schools (and thus produce omitted variables bias in the instrumental variables estimates). This is because state laws change discretely, even if their determinants have rather constant time trends.
Instrumental variables estimates also mitigate measurement error bias, which we expect to be exacerbated in differencesin-differences estimation.
For the sake of comparison I do estimate the first-differenced equations by instrumental variables, although I report the estimates only in footnotes to the tables. It is ambiguous whether IV first-differences provide better identification than least squares. The ambiguity is caused by the following tension. On the "plus" side we expect instrumental variables to reduce measurement error bias in first-differences estimation. On the "minus" side, if instrumental variables are to solve and not exacerbate omitted variables bias in first-differences estimation, then the timing of law changes must be arbitrary. This is a more restrictive (and less appealing) assumption than the identifying restriction needed for instrumental variables in differences-in-differences, where the underlying determinants of law passage may have a districtspecific trend.
Following Tables III through VI 11. Owing to the potential for division bias (such as occurs when hourly wages created by dividing total wages by a measure of hours is regressed on hours), I also estimated the per-pupil spending and student-teacher ratio regressions without including enrollment as an explanatory variable. This variation did not appreciably affect the results.
Each of
12. I weight by enrollment mainly because there are a large number of small rural school districts in the United States that contain relatively few students. It is not clear that such small districts follow the same behavioral model of teachers' unionization that larger districts follow. In practice, unweighted estimates were not consistently larger or smaller than weighted estimates, but the unweighted estimates consistently had larger standard errors. For differenced equations, I weighted by 1982 enrollment. warranted because the results are consistent with our expectations. Per-pupil spending is significantly higher in school districts with larger populations, higher median household income, more educated populations, greater shares of enrollment in private schools, and smaller public school enrollments. In the teacher salary, student-teacher ratio, and dropout rate regressions, estimated coefficients on the same explanatory variables are consistent with our expectations, too. Therefore, I emphasize only particularly interesting results for the other regressions. The effect of teachers' unionization on per-pupil spending is insignificantly different from zero in the cross-section regressions, and the sign is not consistently positive. From the firstdifferences regression, the effect of teachers' unionization is a 3.1 percent increase in per-pupil spending for the 1972-1982 period and an increase that is insignificantly different from zero for the 1982-1992 period. Thus, though the first-differences specification is unlikely to fully resolve the identification problem, the specification does produce results closer to the expectations generated by almost any model of union behavior. The differences-indifferences estimate of teachers' unionization on per-pupil spending is a 2.9 percent increase. However, the IV differences-indifferences regression indicates that per-pupil spending increases by 12.3 percent when teachers unionize. This estimate is highly significant (p-value < .001) despite the adjustment made to the standard errors to account for the fact that laws vary only at the state level. The fact that the IV estimate is so much larger than the first-differences and differences-in-differences estimate suggests that the other estimates suffer from omitted variables bias (districts experiencing negative spending shocks unionize) or measurement error bias or both.
Note that the partial test of whether the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error terms (4i,,lit,2itid, the statistic for which is shown at the bottom of Table III, fails to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation. Also, note that Appendix 2 shows the first-stage linear probability regressions-relating unionization to the passage of facilitating laws-that are implied in the instrumental variables estimates. Each of the laws has a positive effect on the probability of unionization, and the laws are jointly highly significant (p-value < .006).
Figures III and IV provide an alternative presentation of the differences-in-differences and IV differences-in-differences re- In Table IV , I present the effect of teachers' unionization on teacher salaries. The cross-section estimates predict a small salary increase for unionizing teachers: 2.9 percent from the 1970 regression, 4.0 percent from the 1980 regression, and 1.6 percent from the 1990 regression. The first-differences equations indicate that unionizing teachers receive larger salary increases of 4.8 percent from the 1970-1980 equation and 4.0 percent from the 1980-1990 equation. The differences-in-differences estimate is 5.1 percent. The IV differences-in-differences regression predicts a similar unionization effect: a salary increase of 5.0 percent. Table V shows estimates of the student-teacher ratio equation. A decrease in the student-teacher ratio is an increase in school inputs, since it allows smaller regular class sizes and more 13. The figures are not strictly equivalent to the regression estimates, owing to the fact that I do not partial out the effect of the demographic variables on the timing of unionization and the union laws. individualized instruction. Thus, the cross-section and firstdifferences estimates of the effect of teachers's unionization are predictions that unionization raises the student-teacher ratio or decreases teacher and classroom inputs for each student. Previous studies based on cross-section data have interpreted similar results as evidence that teachers' unions increase the studentteacher ratio so as to get salary increases out of a constant perpupil budget (for example, Eberts [1984] ).
However, in the differences-in-differences and IV differencesin-differences regression, the sign of the union effect on the student-teacher ratio is negative, implying that unionization increases this input measure just as it increases per-pupil spending and teacher salaries. The differences-in-differences regression indicates that unionization decreases the student-teacher ratio by 1.11 students. The IV differences-in-differences estimate is larger: unionization decreases the student-teacher ratio by 1.7 students per teacher. Like the IV differences-in-differences estimates of the effect of unionization on per-pupil spending and teacher salaries, this estimate is not merely statistically significantly but economically important. Does the predicted increase in teacher salaries combined with the predicted decrease in the student-teacher ratio wholly explain unionization's effect on per-pupil spending? To answer this question, I calculated the increase in per-pupil spending that would have occurred if every school that actually unionized between 1972 and 1982 had received the increase in teacher salaries and the decrease in the student-teacher ratio predicted for unionizing schools.14 The result was a predicted increase in perpupil spending of 9.5 percent. Compare this with the full predicted effect of unionization on per-pupil spending: 12.3 percent. About three-quarters of the increase in per-pupil spending is destined for teacher salaries or the student-teacher ratio. The remaining fourth of the spending increase is devoted to other school inputs. In the work on productivity that follows, it is useful to assess unions' effect on inputs either (1) through their effect on per-pupil spending or (2) through their effect on the combination of teacher salaries and the student-teacher ratio.
In summary, teachers' unionization appears to increase school budgets and to devote most of this increase to two key 14. I used the IV differences-in-differences estimates. I performed a similar calcuation for schools for unionized between 1982 and 1992, with similar results. 
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school inputs, teacher salaries and the teacher-student ratio. These increases are consistent with either an efficiencyenhancing or a rent-seeking model of unions. As we move across the tables from the cross-section estimates to the IV differencesin-differences estimates, the estimated effect of unionization tends to increase in size. This pattern suggests that omitted variables bias or measurement error bias is being systemically eliminated. Also, in Tables III through V Table VIc presents the differences-in-differences and IV differences-in-differences results. As measures of school inputs, I alternatively use (1) per-pupil spending and (2) the combination of teacher salaries and the student-teacher ratio. To facilitate comparison with typical education production functions, I do estimate the function without unionization. However, the target equations are those that allow unionization to affect both the intercept of the production function and the productivity of school inputs. These equations allow unions to affect schools by the several paths discussed.15
In dropout equations I include as a covariate the share of 16 to 19 year-olds in a district who are aged 18 to 19. This variable accounts for the effects of migration of 18 and 19 year-olds (due to college attendance, job opportunities, or social opportunities) on the measured dropout rate (the number of 16 to 19 year-olds who are not enrolled and do not have a high school degree).16 Unfortunately, it is not possible to perfectly align the dates at which the dropout rates are measured (1970, 1980, and 1990) with the dates at which unionization is measured (1972, 1982, 15. In notes to the tables I report the full effect of unionization-direct and through the inputs and input productivities. The full effect is estimated by excluding measures of inputs and interactions from the equations predicting the dropout rate. I also estimated equations in which unionization and inputs entered only as main effects (no interactions). The results of this specification are shown in Table VIc. 16. Migration of college students is only a problem for those students who establish residence at their college location. Students who live in college housing should be counted with the household of their parents or guardians. [1995] ).17 Table VIb shows first-differenced estimates of the education production function, using the combination of teacher salaries and the student-teacher ratio as the measures of school inputs.18 In the equations without unionization (the first and third columns), teacher salaries appear to have no effect on student achievement, although the point estimates are of the expected 17. The cross-section results show little evidence that unionization affects the dropout rate. The full effects of unionization (noted at the bottom of Table  VIa) sign. The student-teacher ratio is predicted to have small effects. A decrease of one student in the student-teacher ratio improves the dropout rate by about 0.12 percentage points. The second and fourth columns of the table allow unionization to directly affect achievement and allow input productivity to differ between nonunion and union schools. In these first-differenced equations, the inclusion of unionization modestly "normalizes" the education production function. The estimated effects of the inputs on the dropout rate grow in magnitude (a one-student decrease in the student-teacher ratio improves the dropout rate by between 0.16 and 0.19 percentage points), although the effect of teacher salary remains insignificantly different from zero. What is more interesting is that the point estimates suggest that the efficacy of inputs is lower in unionized schools, although the differences are insignificantly different from zero. Also, unionization is predicted to have a direct worsening effect on student achievement. The 1980-1990 estimates predict, for instance, that unionized schools have dropout rates that are 1.8 percentage points higher, all else equal. 19 We expect that omitted variables bias and measurement error bias will be ameliorated by estimating with differences-indifferences and instrumental variables. Table VIc shows these results. The left-hand column repeats the exercise of estimating the education production function without accounting for unioniza-19. The full effects of unionization on the dropout rate (noted at the bottom of Table VIb) are positive. These indicate that the overall effect of unions is to worsen student achievement, even accounting for their ability to obtain greater inputs.
tion. Eliminating school district-specific trends modestly moves the estimates closer to expectations. Both the student-teacher ratio and teacher salaries are predicted to affect student achievement in the expected directions, although the effects remain small. The second column, which estimates the "full effect" of unionization, shows that unionization is predicted to have an overall worsening effect on the dropout rate. Unionized schools have dropout rates that are 2.3 percentage points worse, all else equal. The most interesting results, however, are contained in the right-hand column. When unions are allowed to both directly affect the dropout rate and change the productivity of inputs, it appears that inputs are quite effective in nonunion schools while unionized schools show the traditional pattern of ineffective inputs. In nonunion schools, a one-student decrease in the studentteacher ratio improves the dropout rate by 0.4 percentage points and a ten percent increase in teacher salaries improves the dropout rate by 0.7 percentage points. These are economically relevant effects of inputs. The estimates for unionized schools, taking into account the coefficients on the interactions between unionization and the inputs, show no statistically significant input efficacy. In fact, unionized schools appear to suffer from the "typical" problem that inputs do not matter. Finally, the main effect of unionization is still to worsen the dropout rate. Although unions increase inputs, their direct effect on students plus the fact that input productivity falls means that their overall effect on student achievement is negative.
Figures V and VI provide an alternative presentation of the differences-in-differences and IV differences-in-differences results, akin to Figures III and IV for per-pupil spending. I calculated the residual from a cross-section regression of the dropout rate on the demographic variables (all the independent variables in the third column of Table VIc 
VII. TEACHERS' UNIONS AND SCHOOLS' MARKET POWER
In this section I briefly address the question of whether teachers' unions have greater effects on inputs and student achievement when they are located in areas where schools have greater market power. Either model of unions implies that teachers' unions will be able to exercise greater influence when schools face less competition; that is, when residents of school districts are less likely to react to increased or reallocated school spending by moving to another district. In a world where residents were costlessly mobile among school districts, it would be difficult for a teachers' union either to extract rent or to raise school spending to the socially optimal level if it were above the privately optimal level. Given the results of the previous section, I will focus on the question of whether rent-seeking appears to be more successful in metropolitan areas with less competition among school districts for residents.
Other work has shown that the concentration of enrollment among districts in a metropolitan area is an indicator of residents' ease of mobility among school districts [Hoxby 1995a ; Borland and Howsen 1992]. A Herfindahl index based on school districts' enrollment shares in a metropolitan area is a good summary measure of enrollment concentration. It has the advantage of familiarity (from industries) and of easy interpretation. The index varies from zero (an infinite number of equal-sized districts) to one (one district that monopolizes enrollment). The index increases as the number of districts shrinks and as their enrollment shares become more uneven.
In Table VII , I divide districts into those in metropolitan areas with high enrollment concentration (Herfindahl index > 0.15) and low enrollment concentration (Herfindahl index < 0.05). I then reestimate the equations from the previous tables for each group separately. Table VII shows only the coefficients on unionization from the IV differences-in-differences regressions, since I believe that these are the best identified.20 It appears that unions have a stronger effect in areas with less competition among schools (more concentrated enrollment). For example, unionization raises per-pupil spending by 9 percent but by 4.3 percent in low concentration areas. Similarly, unionization lowers the student-teacher ratio by 2.5 students in high concentration areas but by 1.3 students in low concentration areas. Unionization increases the dropout rate by 2.2 percent in high concentration areas but by only 1.3 percent in low concentration areas. These results indicate that mobile parents may be able to constrain teachers' unions to accept lower budget increases, maintain higher levels of effort, and add fewer administrative encumbrances.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the effect of teachers' unionization, using panel data on United States school districts and state laws that facilitate teachers' unionization. Improvements over previous work include the careful measurement of teacher unionism, 20. The differences-in-differences estimates are reported in the notes accompanying the table. Tables III, IV , V, and VIc (third column) but are estimated separately for metropolitan school district for which the Herfindahl index of enrollment concentration is high (H > 0.15) and is low (H < 0.05).
The differences-in-differences estimates (rather than the IV differences-in-differences estimates) of the same coefficients are as follows. For log(per-pupil spending/1000) as the dependent variable, the estimates are .039 (.016) [ the use of a number of district-specific demographic controls, and the panel nature of the data. Because I observe school districts before, during, and after the decade of unionization, I can attempt to distinguish the effects of unionization from factors that cause a school's teachers to unionize, even if those factors are trending over time. To further isolate the effects of unionization from events in a school that might cause unionization, I use the events of passages of relevant statewide laws to instrument for events of unionization. The resulting estimation strategy combines instrumental variables and differences-in-differences. I find that teachers' unions are primarily rent seeking, raising school budgets and school inputs but lowering student achievement by decreasing the productivity of inputs.
The results thus shed light on the two empirical puzzles that motivated this paper. Teachers unions may be one reason why educational production functions estimated on cohorts schooled before 1960 often find that school quality "matters," while functions estimated on post-1960 cohorts only occasionally show similarly significant results. Second, teachers' unions may be a primary means whereby a lack of competition among public schools translates into more generous school inputs and worse student performance. Unions help us understand how the market structure of schooling affects actual school behavior and student achievement.
APPENDIX 1: DATA
A. Censuses of Governments
The 1972, 1982, and 1992 Censuses of Governments were matched using the unique government identification code. The student-teacher ratio is the ratio of total enrollment to full-timeequivalent instructional personnel. This is not the same as class size, but is more desirable for an analysis of teachers' unionism since teachers' unions draw members from all instructional personnel. Anecdotes suggest that teachers' unions expand employment of nonclassroom teachers, partly as a means of removing unsuccessful teachers from the classroom without job loss. Perpupil spending is total district current expenditure divided by total enrollment. Average teacher's salary is the payroll for full- 
C. NBER Public Sector Bargaining Law Data Set
The state-level law variables are matched by state and year. The "duty to (at least) meet" variable is equal to one if the collective bargaining rights variable in the data set is greater than or equal to two. The "agency shop explicitly allowed" variable is equal to one if the agency shop variable in the data set is greater than or equal to two. The "union shop explicitly allowed" variable is equal to one if the union shop variable in the data set is greater than or equal to two. See Valletta and Freeman [1988] for additional details. LEXIS (an online legal information retrieval system) searches resulted in a few updates of these variables for the period from 1985 to 1990 (beyond the period covered by the NBER data set). 
D. Descriptive

